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In recent years, members of the United States Supreme Court 
have included references to foreign law and international law in 
several opinions interpreting the Federal Constitution.  Some 
members of the Court, political figures, and commentators view 
this development as problematic. 
One of the problems that critics have with this practice 
pertains especially to comparative references to foreign law.  
Critical observers maintain that there is no adequate principled 
basis for distinguishing one country from another.  They imply that 
there is nothing to prevent a court from citing the laws of 
repressive countries, as well as the laws from more freedom-loving 
 
       †   Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; A.B., 1977, University 
of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1980, University of Chicago Law School; LL.M, 1991, 
New York University School of Law.  Many thanks to Jayme Ribaudo for providing 
valuable research assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
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countries, in this comparative endeavor.  I label such critiques the 
“jurisdictional selection objection.”1  With this objection in mind, 
critics reject the comparative enterprise altogether.  They would 
generally prefer that courts stick to home-grown sources and 
precedents when interpreting the Federal Constitution. 
Recent comments by prominent legal and political actors 
illustrate the jurisdictional selection objection.  At a public speech 
designed to support the Supreme Court candidacy of Harriet 
Miers, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales complained about the 
use of foreign law in U.S. constitutional interpretation.2  He 
maintained that “[i]f an American judge wants to find a law 
consistent with his or her personal opinion, it can be found.”3  In 
stating this complaint, General Gonzales referred to remarks made 
by Chief Justice (then Judge) John Roberts during his confirmation 
hearings for the Supreme Court.  The Chief Justice compared the 
use of foreign law in U.S. constitutional interpretation to “looking 
over the crowd and picking out one’s friends.”4 
This Article focuses on one area of federal constitutional law 
that had its share of controversy even before the question of 
foreign and international analysis recently came to the fore:5 the 
 
 1. This phrase was coined by Professor Winer for the purpose of discussing 
any argument criticizing the practice of referencing foreign legal sources in 
constitutional interpretation on the asserted basis that it allows an unfettered 
choice as to which jurisdiction’s authorities to select.  
 2. Mark Sherman, Attorney General: Justices Are Wrong to Cite International Law, 
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 
1129626313552 (on file with author). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. There is a significant distinction between foreign law and international 
law.  For present purposes, the phrase “foreign law” refers to the law of any 
national or sub-national legal system other than that of the United States.  
Accordingly, a reference to French law or Chinese law, for example, would be a 
reference to foreign law.  On the other hand, for present purposes, “international 
law” refers to the multilateral legal system that orders relations among states.  The 
primary elements of this legal system, more broadly called “public international 
law,” are formal written treaties and customary rules of state behavior.  Cf. JAMES R. 
FOX, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 157, 211 (1997) 
(definitional entries for international law and municipal law, respectively).  The 
distinction is important, because the system of public international law is quite 
separate from individual systems of national domestic (often called municipal) 
law.  Commentators complaining about the current Supreme Court practices 
discussed in this Article may be criticizing the Court’s references to either type of 
source.  This Article, however, will generally use the phrase foreign law, since the 
jurisdictional selection objection pertains chiefly to the question of which 
country’s law (which “foreign law”) should be consulted in any particular context. 
2
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issue of how to identify fundamental rights under the substantive 
components of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.  I 
suggest that the law of certain foreign jurisdictions, perhaps some 
more than others, may be helpful in addressing the identification 
of fundamental rights.  Further investigation might show that 
foreign states whose political and philosophical histories formed 
part of the European Enlightenment are appropriate sources of 
comparison.  If so, the history of a foreign jurisdiction’s 
relationship to the European Enlightenment would provide a 
principled basis for choosing which foreign law is appropriately 
referenced when analyzing this feature of the U.S. Constitution. 
I. RECENT USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN  
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
One of the earliest references to foreign law in constitutional 
interpretation, at least with the Court in more or less its present 
configuration, occurred in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Printz v. United 
States.6  In that 1997 case, the Court considered the constitutionality 
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.7  Specifically, the 
Act required regulated firearms dealers in every state to forward 
certain prescribed forms to their local chief law enforcement 
officers, or “CLEOs.”8  The Act also required the CLEOs to make 
“‘reasonable efforts’ . . . to determine whether the sales reflected in 
the forms [were] lawful.”9  The Act authorized the CLEOs to grant 
waivers of a federally prescribed five-day waiting period for 
handgun purchases when they had “no reason to believe that the 
purchases would be illegal.”10 
The Court, per Justice Scalia, viewed this situation as one in 
which the state-government CLEOs were being “pressed into 
federal service.”11  The Court struck down this aspect of the Act, 
holding that “[t]he Federal Government may neither issue 
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States’ officers, or their political subdivisions, to 
 
 6. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 7. Id. at 902; see Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000)). 
 8. Printz, 521 U.S. at 904. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 904-05.  The preceding description of the pertinent Brady Act 
provisions corresponds to 18 U.S.C. § 922(y)(3) and is discussed in the Court’s 
opinion.  Id. 
 11. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
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administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”12  The Court 
arrived at this result, in substantial part, out of concern for the 
“‘inviolable sovereignty’”13 of the States and the necessity of the 
“[p]reservation of the States as independent political entities.”14 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent (joined by Justice Stevens), took 
issue with the majority’s assertion that allowing the federal 
government to direct local law enforcement officers in this way 
would compromise the independence of the States.15  Breyer seems 
to be of the opinion that allowing the States themselves to enforce 
the Brady Act provisions would respect state sovereignty more than 
asking federal officers to perform the same tasks obtrusively within 
the States.16  To bolster his assertion, Justice Breyer referred to the 
structural regimes in Switzerland, Germany, and the European 
Union.17  These “federal systems,” he maintained, “all provide that 
constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves 
implement many of the laws, rules, regulations or decrees enacted 
by the central ‘federal’ body.”18 
Justice Breyer allowed that “[o]f course, we are interpreting 
our own Constitution,” but he maintained that the experience of 
these other governmental regimes might “cast an empirical light on 
the consequences of different solutions to a common legal 
problem.”19  Reaction to this use of foreign law for comparative 
constitutional interpretation was somewhat muted, perhaps 
because the reference was merely in a two-Justice dissent.20 
This was not the situation, however, with the next major use of 
foreign law for constitutional comparison by the Court.  Five years 
later, in Atkins v. Virginia,21 the Court’s majority opinion, rather 
than a mere dissent, referenced foreign legal sources.  Even in 
 
 12. Id. at 935. 
 13. Id. at 918-19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 14. Id. at 919. 
 15. Id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 16. Id. at 976-77 (“[A] system [of local enforcement] interferes less, not 
more, with the independent authority of the ‘state,’ member nation, or other 
subsidiary government, and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.”). 
 17. Id. at 976. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 977. 
 20. The majority opinion in Printz did acknowledge this aspect of Justice 
Breyer’s dissent but only in a footnote.  Id. at 921 n.11 (majority opinion) (“We 
think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a 
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.”). 
 21. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
4
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Atkins, which involved the constitutionality of the execution of 
mentally retarded offenders, the majority’s reference was limited to 
a footnote.22  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, noted that 
during the sixteen years leading up to the Atkins decision, eighteen 
states and the federal government had passed statutes exempting 
the mentally retarded from capital punishment.23  She further 
noted that “even in those States that allow the execution of 
mentally retarded offenders, the practice is uncommon.”24  The 
majority concluded that the execution of the mentally retarded 
“has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national 
consensus has developed against it.”25 
In this context, the Court dropped a footnote intending to 
buttress the idea that such a national consensus had developed.26  
The footnote referenced amicus briefs filed by the American 
Psychological Association, the U.S. Catholic Conference, the 
American Association on Mental Retardation, and others.27  In one 
sentence out of the six composing the footnote, the Court quoted 
an amicus brief submitted by the European Union and stated that 
“within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty 
for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is 
overwhelmingly disapproved.”28 
Despite the relatively minor character of this footnoted, single-
sentence observation, the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) devoted the 
majority of two paragraphs to refuting the references made to 
other countries.29  Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that he “fail[ed] 
to see . . . how the views of other countries regarding the 
punishment of their citizens provide[d] any support for the Court’s 
ultimate determination.”30  He added that “if it is evidence of a 
national consensus for which we are looking, then the viewpoints of 
other countries simply are not relevant.”31 
In the year following the Atkins opinion, references to foreign 
 
 22. Id. at 316 n.21. 
 23. Id. at 313-15. 
 24. Id. at 316. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. n.21. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 325. 
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law finally appeared in the full text of a majority opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas,32 although the references were somewhat 
fleeting.  Lawrence v. Texas is best known as the case in which the 
Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,33 the 1986 Supreme Court case 
that sustained a state statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy 
against a due process challenge.  The Lawrence Court, in an opinion 
written by Justice Kennedy, emphasized that the Bowers Court had 
relied in part on the point that “for centuries there have been 
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral.”34  
Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted that this “condemnation has been 
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable 
behavior, and respect for the traditional family.”35 
In overturning Bowers, the Lawrence Court declared that “our 
laws and traditions in the past half century,” rather than those of 
earlier eras, “are of most relevance here.”36  The Court observed 
that these laws and traditions “show an emerging awareness that 
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how 
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”37  
Furthermore, the majority insisted that the Bowers Court, seventeen 
years earlier, should have acknowledged this “emerging 
recognition.”38  In support of this point, the Court cited several 
legal developments that occurred prior to the Bowers decision, 
including the release of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code in 1955 and patterns of non-enforcement of state criminal 
sodomy statutes.39 
To further substantiate the prior existence of this “emerging 
recognition,” the Court referenced two developments from foreign 
jurisdictions.  The first was the 1957 Wolfenden Report, 
commissioned to advise the British Parliament.40  The Report 
 
 32. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 33. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 34. 539 U.S. at 571. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 571-72. 
 37. Id. at 572. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 572-73.  The Model Penal Code “did not recommend or provide for 
‘criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private.’”  Id. at 
572 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)). 
 40. Id. at 572-73 (citing The Wolfenden Report:  Report of the Committee on 
Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution (1963) (reprinting COMMITTEE ON 
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957 (London:  HM Stationery Office, 
6
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recommended the repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct, 
and Parliament adopted this recommendation ten years later.41  
The second reference was to the 1981 decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights in the case of Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.42  
The Lawrence Court noted that in Dudgeon, the European Court 
determined that the laws of Northern Ireland forbidding 
consensual homosexual conduct within the home violated the 
European Convention on Human Rights.43 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion (joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) criticized these references to 
foreign law.44  Justice Scalia complained that “[c]onstitutional 
entitlements do not spring into existence . . . because foreign nations 
decriminalize conduct.”45  He also criticized the Court’s discussion 
of foreign views as meaningless, even dangerous, dictum.46 
Three days before issuing the Lawrence opinion, the Court 
issued the much-awaited affirmative action opinions in Grutter v. 
Bollinger47 and Gratz v. Bollinger.48  The Grutter decision contained a 
foreign reference that was far less significant, as it came in a 
concurring opinion, rather than in the majority opinion as in 
Lawrence.49  Grutter involved the admissions policy at the University 
of Michigan Law School, which aspired to “‘achieve that diversity 
which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education,’”50 and 
which reflected the law school’s “longstanding commitment” to 
“‘racial and ethnic diversity.’”51 
In an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Court held that 
the law school had a compelling interest in attaining a diverse 
student body52 and that the law school’s admissions policy bore the 
 
1957) and the British Sexual Offenses Act, 1967, § 1 (Eng.))). 
 41. Id. at 572-73. 
 42. Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 
(1981)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  Justice Scalia identified this dictum as “dangerous” because “‘this 
Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’”  Id. 
(quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 47. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 48. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 49. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. at 315 (citation omitted). 
 51. Id. at 316 (citation omitted). 
 52. Id. at 328. 
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hallmarks of a plan narrowly tailored to advance that interest.53  
The Court thus concluded that the Equal Protection Clause54 did 
not prohibit the law school’s use of race in admissions pursuant to 
its policy.55  Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor’s opinion warned in its 
closing paragraphs that “race-conscious admissions policies must be 
limited in time.”56  Accordingly, the Court majority delineated its 
expectation that “[twenty-five] years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.”57 
Justice Ginsburg, in a four-paragraph concurring opinion 
joined by Justice Breyer,58 focused mainly on indications that racial 
minority students still suffer substantial disadvantages in 
educational opportunities.59  In the first of those four paragraphs, 
however, she noted that the twenty-five-year end point specified in 
the majority opinion “accords with the international understanding 
of the office of affirmative action.”60  In so doing, she cited 
provisions of two international multilateral treaties:61 the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination,62 which the United States has signed and ratified, 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women,63 which the United States has 
signed but not ratified.  Justice Ginsburg cited provisions in each of 
these anti-discrimination treaties that support the idea that 
affirmative action measures should be short-lived and 
 
 53. Id. at 334. 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 55. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
 56. Id. at 342.  A durational limitation reflects the danger of racial 
classifications, which must be employed no more broadly than the compelling 
interest demands.  Id. 
 57. Id. at 343. 
 58. Id. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 59. Id.  Justice Ginsburg pointed out that in the 2000-2001 school year, 71.6% 
of African-American children and 76.3% of Hispanic children in the public school 
system attended schools in which minorities made up a majority of the student 
body.  Id. at 345.  The educational resources available to schools in predominantly 
minority communities lag far behind those available to other public schools.  Id. 
 60. Id. at 344. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (citing International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 
352). 
 63. Id. (citing Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33). 
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impermanent.64 
In the 2005 case of Roper v. Simmons,65 the Court included the 
most extensive discussion of foreign sources that has yet appeared 
in a majority opinion for the purposes of constitutional 
interpretation.66  In Roper, the Court held that “[t]he Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on 
offenders who were under the age of [eighteen] when their crimes 
were committed.”67  In the main body of the opinion, the Court 
wrote that the death penalty, because it is the most severe 
punishment, must be reserved for a narrow category of crimes and 
offenders.68  The Court then determined that juveniles have 
diminished culpability for their crimes because of their relative lack 
of maturity, undeveloped sense of responsibility, vulnerability to 
negative influences and outside pressures, and incompletely 
formed character.69  Furthermore, the Court determined that the 
penological justifications of retribution and deterrence applied to 
juveniles with lesser force than to adults.70  Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment 
 
 64. Id. (“[S]pecial and concrete measures to ensure the adequate 
development and protection of certain racial groups . . . shall in no case entail . . . 
unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which 
they were taken have been achieved.” (quoting International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 2(2), opened for signature 
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218, 5 I.L.M. 352, 355)); id. (“[T]emporary special 
measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not 
be considered discrimination, [but] shall be discontinued when the objectives of 
equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.” (quoting Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 4(1), Dec. 
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 16, 19 I.L.M. 33, 37)). 
 65. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 66. Professor Alford has recently published an essay focused specifically on the use 
of foreign sources in Roper.  His somewhat ironic discussion of what he terms 
“international equipoise” sounds to a substantial degree in the jurisdictional selection 
objection.  He suggests, however, that the full range of constitutional rights should be 
subject to comparative analysis.  Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our 
Constitution in International Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21-27 (2005); see also 
references to other critiques by Professor Alford infra text accompanying notes 135-148.  
Additionally, Professor Ernest Young has recently addressed the problem of foreign law 
in Roper, although in ways that do not necessarily affect what is said in this Article.  See 
Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 
(2005). 
 67. 125 S. Ct. at 1200. 
 68. Id. at 1194-95. 
 69. Id. at 1195. 
 70. Id. at 1196. 
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for offenders under eighteen.71 
Having reached this conclusion, however, the Court went on 
to survey certain authorities culled from foreign and international 
law.72  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began this 
discussion by asserting that “the United States is the only country in 
the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile 
death penalty.”73  While acknowledging that “[t]his reality does not 
become controlling,”74 the Court was plainly moved by it.  The 
Court then referred to four international conventions that prohibit 
or sharply disfavor execution of juveniles, including the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.75 
The Court next noted that “only seven countries other than 
the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990,” but 
that since then, each of the other countries “has either abolished 
capital punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the 
practice.”76  The Court next put special emphasis on the experience 
of the United Kingdom regarding this subject “in light of the 
historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth 
Amendment’s own origins”77 in the 1689 English Declaration of 
Rights.78  The Court determined that although the United 
Kingdom has abolished the death penalty completely, “decades 
before it took this step, it recognized the disproportionate nature 
of the juvenile death penalty.”79  Finally, the Court concluded that 
“[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our 
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for 
 
 71. Id. at 1198. 
 72. Id. at 1198-1200. 
 73. Id. at 1198. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1199.  The Court noted that the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child has been ratified “by every country in the world . . . save the 
United States and Somalia.”  Id. (citing United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1990)).  The other 
three conventions cited by the Court were the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 146, 9 I.L.M. 763, and 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990).  125 S. Ct. at 1199. 
 76. 125 S. Ct. at 1199.  The seven other countries listed by the Court are Iran, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
China.  Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (citing 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 10 (1770)). 
 79. Id. 
10
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our own conclusions.”80 
The majority opinion of the Court in Roper is not the only 
portion of the decision that notably addresses the use of foreign 
law in analyzing the U.S. Constitution.  The two dissenting opinions 
in Roper criticize the majority’s use of foreign sources.  However, 
the dissenting opinions by Justices O’Connor81 and Scalia82 are 
miles apart in terms of tone and perspective. 
Justice O’Connor begins by clarifying that she “agree[s] with 
much of the Court’s description of the general principles that 
guide our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”83  In the bulk of her 
opinion’s eleven pages, however, she maintains that no national 
consensus within the United States has emerged against the capital 
punishment of seventeen-year-old offenders.84  Only two of these 
eleven pages are devoted to the Court’s treatment of foreign or 
international sources,85 and the Court gets off fairly lightly at Justice 
O’Connor’s hands.  Although she concedes that “there has been a 
global trend in recent years towards abolishing capital punishment 
for under-[eighteen] offenders,” her view that there is no 
widespread agreement within the United States prevents her from 
assigning a “confirmatory role” to that international consensus.86  She 
nevertheless explicitly insists that she “disagree[s] with Justice 
Scalia’s contention that foreign and international law have no place 
in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”87  Justice O’Connor 
softens her criticism of the majority’s approach by acknowledging 
that “the existence of an international consensus of this nature can 
serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine 
American consensus.”88  However, since she finds no American 
consensus, this particular opinion does not seem an appropriate 
one for the confirmatory role of foreign or international sources. 
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, sees no need to embark on 
such a softened approach.  Approximately five of the fourteen 
 
 80. Id. at 1200. 
 81. Id. at 1206-17 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 1217-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 1206 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 84. E.g., id. (“Although the Court finds support for its decision in the fact that 
a majority of the States now disallow capital punishment of [seventeen]-year-old 
offenders, it refrains from asserting that its holding is compelled by a genuine 
national consensus.”). 
 85. Id. at 1215-16. 
 86. Id. at 1215. 
 87. Id.  (citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 1216. 
11
Winer: A Speculation on Enlightenment Roots, Foreign Law, and Fundamenta
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
02WINER.DOC 1/14/2006  5:38:29 PM 
520 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
pages of his dissent are devoted to his criticism of the majority’s use 
of foreign and international sources.89  Most of these pages are 
devoted to a frontal attack on the use of foreign and international 
sources in constitutional interpretation generally, quite divorced 
from the context of juvenile execution.90  Justice Scalia asserts that 
a significant number of foreign nations do not employ an 
evidentiary exclusionary rule as does the United States,91 do not 
“insist on the degree of separation between church and state that 
this Court requires,”92 and are less apt to allow for “abortion on 
demand” than the United States.93  These observations are 
illustrations of the jurisdictional selection objection, because his 
point suggests that if the Justices in the majority chose the law of 
different foreign jurisdictions in different contexts, they would get 
results that were less popular or less palatable to those Justices.  By 
emphasizing these differences between foreign and U.S. law, Justice 
Scalia seems to suggest that a weakness of a foreign-source 
approach is the fortuity of which foreign countries’ laws are chosen 
for reference.  His criticism is, to that extent, based on the 
jurisdictional selection objection. 
 
II.  EXTERNAL COMMENTARY ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS BY MEMBERS OF THE COURT 
Among the most prominent external commentators on the 
Court’s use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation are 
members of the Court themselves. 
At the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law (ASIL), Justice Stephen Breyer declared that 
“foreign experience is often important” to the work of the Supreme 
Court.94  In his presentation, he outlined five kinds of experiences 
out of which his perception of the usefulness of foreign law arises.95  
Specifically, he noted: (1) many domestic legal questions directly 
implicate foreign or international law; (2) for an increasing 
 
 89. Id. at 1225-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 1226-27 (referring to United States evidentiary rules forbidding the 
use of evidence obtained by illegal means). 
 92. Id. at 1227. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 265 
(2003). 
 95. Id. at 265-67. 
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number of issues, including constitutional issues, the decisions of 
foreign courts offer helpful points of comparison; (3) foreign 
jurisdictions offer helpful materials apart from formal court 
decisions, such as Council of Europe guidelines on the application 
of precedents from the European Court; (4) foreign judges offer 
valuable perspectives on institutional matters, such as overcrowded 
dockets and mediation programs; and (5) traditional public 
international law issues arise in the course of the Court’s daily 
work.96  These comments illustrate Justice Breyer’s support for 
using foreign sources to interpret the U.S. Constitution. 
Two years later, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed her 
support of using international sources in constitutional 
interpretation in her address before the ASIL Annual Meeting.97  As 
an initial matter, Justice Ginsburg noted a symmetry in comparative 
constitutional discourse: “[i]f U.S. experience and decisions can be 
instructive to systems that have more recently instituted or 
invigorated judicial review for constitutionality, so we can learn 
from others now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and executive 
actions against charters securing basic rights.”98  In this vein, she 
declared that the U.S. judicial system “will be the poorer . . . if we 
do not both share our experience with, and learn from, legal 
systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to our 
own.”99 
Justice Ginsburg reviewed aspects of U.S. constitutional 
history, and she suggested that foreign and international law played 
a significant role in the founding of the republic and the text of the 
Constitution.100  She referenced the passages of the Declaration of 
Independence according “a decent Respect to the Opinions of 
Mankind” and soliciting the scrutiny of “a candid world” for the 
actions of the fledgling state.101  She also emphasized that the 
Constitution granted Congress the power to “define and punish . . . 
Offenses against the Law of Nations,”102 and that the framers 
considered that “the new nation would be bound by ‘the law of 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Keynote Address: The Value of a Comparative Perspective 
in Constitutional Adjudication, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. (forthcoming 2005), 
available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html. 
 98. Id. para. 2. 
 99. Id. para. 3. 
 100. Id. para. 6-11. 
 101. Id. para. 8. 
 102. Id. para. 11 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10). 
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Nations’ . . . .”103  She drew attention to the famous Charming Betsy 
canon, first declared by Chief Justice John Marshall, to the effect 
that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the 
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”104 
Conversely, Justice Antonin Scalia articulated his opposition to 
the use of foreign sources in constitutional interpretation in his 
keynote address at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the ASIL.105  Justice 
Scalia stated that in his view “modern foreign legal materials can 
never be relevant to an interpretation of—to the meaning of—the 
U.S. Constitution.”106  He further offered three reasons why he 
expected the Court’s use of foreign law in constitutional 
interpretation to accelerate.107  First, he maintained that the “‘living 
Constitution’ paradigm . . . prevails on the Court” and suggested 
that those who espoused this view, “living constitutionalists,” are 
illegitimately writing new constitutional provisions.108  If one is 
frankly involved in the process of writing a new constitution, he 
complained, “there is no reason foreign materials should not be 
used along with all others.”109 
Second, he asserted that the modern Court will continue to 
use foreign law to support its “living-constitution decisions” because 
it supplies “something concrete to rely upon,” maintaining that 
“logical analysis” would not be a concrete basis for such reliance.110  
Finally, he argued that Court majorities would find it attractive to 
use foreign law because “it vastly increases the scope of their 
discretion.”111 
Probably the most detailed published discussion by any 
Supreme Court Justice regarding the use of foreign sources to 
interpret U.S. constitutional law is actually the transcript of a 
debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer.112  This debate took 
 
 103. Id. para. 11. 
 104. Id. para. 12 (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 
(1804)). 
 105. Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 
98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004). 
 106. Id. at 307. 
 107. Id. at 308-09. 
 108. Id. at 308. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 308-09. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, U.S. Association of 
Constitutional Law Discussion: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court 
Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/ 
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place on January 13, 2005 at the American University Washington 
College of Law and was presented by the U.S. Association of 
Constitutional Law.113  The discussion, moderated by Professor 
Norman Dorsen of the New York University Law School,114 is 
notable for its depth and the extent to which it allowed each Justice 
to fully state his position on this issue. 
In the debate, Justice Scalia provided several arguments 
against the use of foreign sources, though many of his arguments 
were variations on the jurisdictional selection objection.115  Three 
examples suffice.  Early in the discussion, Scalia complained that 
the majority decision in Lawrence cited “foreign law—not all foreign 
law, just the foreign law of countries that agreed with the 
disposition of the case.  But we said not a whisper about foreign law 
in the series of abortion cases.”116  He then asked, “[W]hat is the 
criterion for citing [foreign law]?  That it agrees with you?  I don’t 
know any other criterion to bring forward.”117  In these comments, 
he maintained that the Court used those rulings of foreign law with 
which its members agreed, rather than embarking on a principled 
examination of all foreign law or at least without a principled basis 
for choosing which foreign law to reference and which law to de-
emphasize or ignore.118 
He emphasized the same point later with particular reference 
 
050113.cfm (follow “Press release and full transcript” hyperlink). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Professor Dorsen is also the founding president of the U.S. Association of 
Constitutional Law. 
 115. During this January 2005 discussion, Justice Scalia voiced two other 
arguments against the use of foreign sources in this context that were not variants 
of the jurisdictional selection objection.  The first was that “one of the difficulties 
of using foreign law is that you don’t understand what the surrounding 
jurisprudence is.”  Scalia & Breyer, supra note 112.  That is, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to accurately understand foreign laws unless one is operating within 
the same legal culture from which it emanates, and most U.S. judges and justices 
are not.  Accordingly, the use of foreign law by U.S. judges and justices may often 
be a misapplication of foreign law.  Second, Justice Scalia insists that the U.S. 
Constitution, to the limited extent it should reflect the current views of any 
population, should “keep up to date with the views of the American people,” as 
opposed to the views of foreign populations or authorities.  Id.  This point might 
simply be paraphrased as the assertion that the U.S. Constitution is meant to 
govern and apply to a distinctly American political and legal culture, and 
therefore, foreign influences in interpreting it are inappropriate simply by virtue 
of their not being American. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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to European law.  He allowed that: 
[I]t was true that throughout all of Europe, it was 
unlawful to prohibit homosexual sodomy.  The [C]ourt 
did not cite the rest of the world.  It was easy to find out 
what the rest of the world thought about it.  I cited in my 
dissent the rest of the world was equally divided.119 
This comment is based on the jurisdictional selection objection: 
Justice Scalia maintained in effect that there is no principled way to 
consider favorable European legal sources without giving equal 
consideration to other legal sources from other countries. 
The other participants in the debate also acknowledged the 
jurisdictional selection objection.  At one point Justice Breyer 
himself conceded that in one of his opinions he may have made a 
“tactical error in citing a case from Zimbabwe—not the human 
rights capital of the world.”120  This concession sounded in the 
jurisdictional selection objection, because he acknowledged that 
the choice of which foreign country’s law to reference can have 
serious implications for the quality of one’s argument, and he 
seemed to concede that the choice of country is a matter essentially 
of discretion. 
Indeed, even the moderator, Professor Dorsen asked a question of 
Justice Breyer that presented the jurisdictional selection objection.  He 
stated: “I’m not sure I see many citations to East Asian courts, to South 
American courts, to Islamic courts.  And is it a fair criticism that there’s 
a certain selectivity that is substantively or result-oriented in the ways 
foreign references are considered by you and those who agree with 
you?”121  Thus, throughout this debate, which is one of the most 
thorough published discussions by Supreme Court Justices on this 
subject, one of the primary arguments stated in apprehension of 
the use of foreign law is the jurisdictional selection objection. 
III. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AS VIEWED BY 
OTHER COMMENTATORS 
Academic commentators, like members of the Supreme Court, 
have varying views of the suitability of foreign law for interpreting 
the Constitution.  Among the most influential is Harold Hongju 
Koh, currently the Dean of Yale Law School and a former President 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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of the ASIL.  The American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 
prominently stated some of his views in a 2004 symposium, which 
also contained other essays discussed in the following paragraphs of 
this Article.122  
Professor Koh’s symposium article emphasized the historical 
pedigree of foreign and international law in early opinions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.123  He referenced the Charming Betsy canon 
discussed above124 and attached importance to John Marshall’s 
statement in McCulloch v. Maryland that the supremacy of the 
federal union within the scope of its powers would be a 
“proposition [that] could command the universal assent of 
mankind.”125  He maintained that Marshall’s early opinions 
“expressly promoted the implicit or explicit internalization of 
international law into U.S. domestic law”126 and that “at the 
beginning of the republic, U.S. courts drew no sharp line between 
international and foreign law.”127 
In Professor Koh’s view, the Court has used foreign and 
international precedents to interpret the Constitution in three 
contexts: (1) when “parallel rules” are involved; that is, when U.S. 
legal rules seem parallel to those of other countries;128 (2) when 
“empirical light” seems to exist; that is, when the experiences of 
other countries cast empirical light on the consequences of 
different solutions to common legal problems;129 and (3) when 
“community standards” are material to adjudication; that is, when 
certain constitutional restrictions, such as “cruel and unusual” and 
“due process of law,” are interpreted in the context of community 
values.130 
Other academic commentators have supported such 
references to foreign and international law.  In an article appearing 
 
 122. Harold Hongju Koh, International: Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 43 (2004). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 44; see supra text accompanying note 104 (describing Justice 
Ginsburg’s later reference to the Charming Betsy canon in her 2005 address to the 
American Society of International Law). 
 125. Koh, supra note 122, at 45 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 
405-07 (1918)). 
 126. Id. at 44. 
 127. Id. at 45. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 46. 
 130. Id. at 45-46 (quoting Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)). 
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in the same AJIL symposium described above,131 Professor Gerald 
Neuman used historical Supreme Court opinions and 
constitutional provisions to defend the nexus between U.S. 
constitutional interpretation, on the one hand, and international 
and foreign law, on the other.132  Other commentators reporting 
favorably on the practice include Professors Sanford Levinson133 
and David Law.134 
Academic perspectives are not unanimous in favor of foreign 
and international references, to say the least.  Among the most 
active challengers is Professor Roger Alford.135  In his contribution 
to the 2004 AJIL symposium,136 Professor Alford warned that the 
use of international precedents “could have the unintended 
consequence of undermining rather than promoting numerous 
constitutional guaranties.”137  Initially, he argued that using 
international sources could be “countermajoritarian”138 and could 
dangerously elevate international sources over constitutional 
restraints, thereby defeating the asserted supremacy of the 
Constitution over international law.139 
The main thrust of Professor Alford’s critique, however, seems 
 
 131. Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (2004). 
 132. Id. at 82-84.  Professor Neuman stated that “[i]n the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, after the Civil War had vindicated the Union’s claim to 
nationhood, the Supreme Court repeatedly invoked international law doctrines 
and writers in support of its elaboration of powers inherent in national 
sovereignty.”  Id. at 82-83.  Neuman also described Supreme Court references to 
foreign and international law in construing the Treaty Clause (U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 2), the Thirteenth Amendment, the Eighteenth Amendment, and other 
constitutional provisions.  Id. at 82-84. 
 133. Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution:  
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 355 (2004) (“[T]here ought to be no 
country, most certainly including our own, that should regard its own instantiated 
commitment to social justice or human rights as absolutely pristine, in need of no 
wisdom that might be provided by external sources.”). 
 134. David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 659 (2005) 
(“To expound a constitution—any constitution—is to draw upon and contribute 
to a body of principle, practice, and precedent that transcends jurisdictional 
boundaries.  Commonalities emerge across jurisdictions because constitutional law 
develops within a web of reciprocal influences . . . .”). 
 135. Roger P. Alford is an Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University 
School of Law.  Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the 
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 69 n.a1 (2004). 
 136. Id. at 57. 
 137. Id. at 58. 
 138. Id. at 58-61. 
 139. Id. at 61-64. 
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to be that the use of international sources tends to be 
“haphazard,”140 because practitioners of this method are “relying 
only on those materials that are readily at [their] fingertips”141 and 
“selective,”142 in the sense that “international sources are proposed 
for comparison only if they are viewed as rights enhancing.”143 
These last two arguments, particularly the second, are variants 
of the jurisdictional selection objection.  As explained, the 
jurisdictional selection objection is the argument that there is no 
principled way to decide which countries from which to draw 
precedent.144  It asserts that a comparative analysis could just as 
easily draw on legal precedents from comparatively oppressive as 
well as comparatively progressive regimes.145  Accordingly, if analysts 
using comparative methods subjectively choose only precedents 
from rights-enhancing jurisdictions, they are simply advancing their 
own policy preferences without a principled basis for doing so.146 
In a later article, Professor Alford examined the use of foreign 
and international sources under four constitutional theories: 
originalism, natural rights, majoritarianism, and pragmatism.147  He 
suggested that “the use of contemporary foreign and international 
laws and practices to interpret constitutional guarantees is ill-suited 
under most modern constitutional theories.”148  Implicit in his 
suggestion was a criticism of a perceived lack of coherence for 
comparative constitutional interpretation that is also consistent 
with his earlier criticism sounding in the jurisdictional selection 
objection. 
In another article included in the 2004 AJIL symposium,149 
Professor Michael Ramsey demurred on the ultimate question of 
whether reference to foreign sources was desirable in interpreting 
 
 140. Id. at 64-67. 
 141. Id. at 64. 
 142. Id. at 67-69. 
 143. Id. at 67. 
 144. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 145. Id. 
 146. In advancing his “selective use” argument, Professor Alford seems to focus 
on the policy-based selection of particular precedents, perhaps within particular 
foreign jurisdictions, rather than policy-based selection of the jurisdictions 
themselves.  Alford, supra note 135, at 67-69.  But his policy-based argument fairly 
implies the jurisdiction-based objection as well. 
 147. Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005). 
 148. Id. at 712. 
 149. Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on 
Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (2004). 
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the U.S. Constitution.150  Instead, he asked: “[I]f we are to 
undertake a serious project of using international materials in this 
way, what would that project look like?”151  He arrived at four 
“guidelines” for developing a “principled approach:” (1) there 
must be a neutral theory as to which international materials are 
relevant and how they should be used; (2) analysts and 
commentators must be willing to “take the bitter with the sweet;” 
using international materials to constrict as well as expand rights; 
(3) there must be rigorous empirical inquiry about international 
practices; and (4) hasty shortcuts to world consensus must be 
avoided.152 
The first of these guidelines, as described by Professor Ramsey, 
is in part a statement of the jurisdictional selection objection.  He 
even described a portion of his argument on this point in terms of 
jurisdictional selection.  He noted that Mary Robinson, a former 
U.N. Commissioner of Human Rights, submitted a brief to the U.S. 
Supreme Court for its consideration153 in Lawrence v. Texas.154  He 
noted that at one point the Robinson brief explained that in 
various foreign jurisdictions sodomy was no longer a criminal 
offense.155  Ramsey then maintained, however, that “[w]ithout a 
theory as to why (for example) Israel’s practice matters and India’s 
does not, the brief’s citation of Israel and not India cannot be 
justified.”156  This illustrates a clear statement of the jurisdictional 
selection objection as previously defined. 
IV. THE JURISDICTIONAL SELECTION OBJECTION CONSIDERED 
I offer two primary responses to the jurisdictional selection 
objection.  The first responds to a general complaint to the use of 
foreign or international sources that is non-substantive and is easily 
dismissed.157  The other is that the objection does state a legitimate 
concern.158 
 
 150. Id. at 69. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 69-70. 
 153. Id. at 70. 
 154. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 155. Ramsey, supra note 149, at 72 (discussing Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 
WL 164151). 
 156. Id. at 73. 
 157. See infra Part IV.A. 
 158. See infra Part IV.B. 
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A. Dismissing an Initial Objection 
One complaint intended to bolster the jurisdictional selection 
objection is non-substantive and should be dismissed immediately.  
The complaint is that merely because the use of foreign law 
presents the judge or justice with a choice of which jurisdiction to 
consult, it is somehow illegitimate to consult foreign law in general.  
This was the objection voiced by Chief Justice Roberts during his 
Senate confirmation hearings for Chief Justice.159  Although this 
objection has surface appeal to some, it is inadequate. 
Judges and justices must frequently choose among different 
legal sources to reference.  State court judges and justices 
frequently cite the courts of other states, not for binding precedent 
but for persuasive authority.160  Federal courts may cite decisions of 
other federal courts (or even state courts) outside their geographic 
circuits, again not for binding precedent but for persuasive impact. 
Both federal and state court judges and justices may cite other 
types of sources, such as treatises on economics, history, or political 
science, even though they have no binding legal effect.161  In each 
such instance, the judge or justice chooses among a virtually 
limitless selection of sources, precisely on the basis of which sources 
are most persuasive.  The mere fact that the judge or justice makes 
a selection is not any more suspect when the selection is among 
foreign sources than when it is among domestic ones. 
It may be that in these circumstances a better judicial opinion 
will also acknowledge any opposing authority from state court, 
 
 159. See supra text accompanying note 4  (describing Chief Justice Roberts’s 
reported assertion comparing the use of foreign law in U.S. constitutional 
interpretation to “looking over the crowd and picking one’s friends”). 
 160. This point was made, for example, by moderator Norman Dorsen during 
the debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer referred to earlier.  Scalia & Breyer, 
supra note 112 (suggesting that a U.S. court can look at the opinions of a foreign 
court for the persuasiveness of its opinions, “just as a New York court might look at 
a Montana decision and be influenced not by the result . . . but by the cogency of 
the arguments”). 
 161. The frequency with which U.S. federal courts cite authorities in the field 
of economics when deciding anti-trust issues, for example, should require no 
citation.  It is true that the use of political science sources created a stir among 
some when Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided.  See, e.g., 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1476 n.12 (2d ed., The 
Foundation Press, Inc. 1988) (1978) (“The Court’s reliance on social science 
evidence, as well as the reliability of the evidence itself, has been severely 
criticized.”).  Nevertheless, scruples in this regard have been long-since resolved, 
at least to judge by the published opinions of a significant portion of the American 
judiciary. 
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federal court, or academic authority of equivalent stature.  It may 
well be that a better opinion will do that no less with respect to 
foreign authority than domestic authority.  But simply the assertion 
that better opinions acknowledge countervailing authority does not 
mean that the choice of persuasive authority to begin with should 
never be made. 
B.  The Realistic Jurisdictional Selection Issue 
Notwithstanding the non-substantive complaint described 
above, the jurisdictional selection objection does state a legitimate 
issue.  Merely because the exercise of a choice is not per se 
inappropriate does not mean that all choices made will necessarily 
be equally appropriate.  There are indeed many countries in the 
world with organized legal systems.  It seems warranted to presume 
that the precedents of not all foreign jurisdictions will be equally 
relevant to all issues in all cases.  There must be principled bases 
for deciding which jurisdictions are suitable for citation in given 
circumstances and which are not. 
A central point to note about this conundrum is that there is 
no reason that the same basis for selection should necessarily 
pertain to all circumstances.  The recent Supreme Court opinions 
that have cited foreign precedent dealt with a variety of 
constitutional provisions and values, from federalism,162 to the 
Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual 
punishment,163 to the right of privacy under the Due Process 
Clauses.164  Each of these provisions involves different constitutional 
values and, even in the domestic sphere, attracts its own distinct 
sets of precedents. 
It seems quite possible that the extent and character of foreign 
 
 162. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding 
unconstitutional portions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that 
required state governments to implement a federal program); see supra notes 6-20 
and accompanying text. 
 163. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (holding that the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on persons 
who committed their crimes before the age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals is 
excessive punishment restricted by the Constitution); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 21-31, 65-93. 
 164. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a 
Texas statute criminalizing “deviate sexual intercourse” with another person of the 
same sex); see also supra text accompanying notes 32-46. 
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references could and should vary according to which constitutional 
provisions are at issue.  In any event, the examination of one such 
issue under review, to the exclusion of others, would seem justified 
as a tentative step towards the resolution of the jurisdictional 
selection objection, at least for that issue.  Perhaps if warranted at a 
later point in time, such a resolution for that issue can serve as a 
basis for resolving a broader set of issues.  For present purposes, 
however, it must suffice to suggest a way in which reference to the 
laws of certain types of particular countries can be legitimately 
preferred over the laws of others in addressing one specific issue in 
U.S. constitutional law. 
V. THE EUROPEAN ENLIGHTENMENT, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,  
AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
The United States Constitution was an outgrowth of the 
cultural and political forces of its time.  This point is commonly 
conceded, though prominent commentators tend to emphasize 
roots in the specifically British common law and constitutional 
tradition.165  The point suggested here is much broader.  Many of 
the ideas reflected in the U.S. Constitution were developed during 
the immediately preceding generations by the writers of the 
European Enlightenment.166  It is important to recognize that fact 
and accord it substantial weight when analyzing the U.S. 
Constitution. 
The contents of the Enlightenment and its beginning and 
 
 165. E.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 12-13 (1985) (emphasizing the impact of “the 
historical ‘rights of Englishmen’” on American law); Scalia & Breyer, supra note 
112 (Justice Scalia asserts that “foreign law is irrelevant with one exception: Old 
English law, because phrases like ‘due process,’ the ‘right of confrontation’ and 
things of that sort were all taken from English law”); see also, e.g.,  RETT R. 
LUDWIKOWSKI & WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 7 
(1993) (“Most of the provisions in the 1787 Constitution and the 1791 Bill of 
Rights have antecedents in either British or state government documents, as well 
as in the Constitution’s immediate predecessor, the Articles of Confederation.”). 
 166. The Enlightenment has been defined as “a philosophic movement of the 
[eighteenth] century characterized by an untrammeled but frequently uncritical 
use of reason, a lively questioning of authority and traditional doctrines and 
values, a tendency toward individualism, and an emphasis on the idea of universal 
human progress and on the empirical method in science.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 754 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993); see also 1 PETER 
GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION: THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM 3-27 
(1966) (discussing the philosophies of the Enlightenment that formed many of 
the views of American political thinkers). 
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ending points are not universally agreed upon.167  However, for 
present purposes this Article will define the phrase “European 
Enlightenment” as collectively describing the work of a significant 
number of prominent philosophers and political theorists who, 
from the early seventeenth century through the late eighteenth 
century (approximately 200 years), had a profound effect on the 
political and social development of modern Western Civilization.168 
Among the concepts developed by these singular thinkers were 
various refinements on a contractarian theory between the 
individual and the State,169 the importance of individual autonomy 
and fulfillment both to the individual and to the State,170 the 
 
 167. Professor Gay addressed the differing views of beginning and ending 
points for the Enlightenment, finally deciding upon what he considered dates that 
the most “traditional” historical approaches would discern:  the hundred-year 
period between 1689 and 1789.  1 GAY, supra note 166, at 17.  Others also date the 
Enlightenment from shortly before the end of the seventeenth century.  See, e.g., 
Werner Schneiders, Reason, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 1125 (Michel 
Delon, et al. eds., 2001) (“From the beginning of the Aufklärung—that is, around 
1690—German philosophers conceived their mission as one of enlightenment or 
as an improvement of understanding.” (internal quotations omitted)).  However, 
my focus is on the genealogy of the U.S. Constitution, and in my opinion, the 
philosophical antecedents require a longer period of reference.  Beginning the 
Enlightenment in the early seventeenth century allows for the inclusion of 
Descartes, for example, whose influence on Locke is clear and whose work played 
a key role in developing the tension between rationality and empiricism.  E.g., 
RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 335 (1991) (“Locke, however, 
attempted a partial solution to such problems by making the distinction (following 
Galileo and Descartes) between primary and secondary qualities—between those 
qualities that inhere in all extended material objects as objectively measurable, like 
weight and shape and motion, and those that inhere only in the subjective human 
experience of those objects, like taste and odor and color.”).  There seems to be 
less disagreement about the ending point, although it might be said that this is less 
material.  Michel Delon, Representations of Enlightenment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT, supra, at 461 (“[T]he [modern] critical attitude implies avoiding 
the choice between being inside or being outside [the Enlightenment].  
Enlightenment man [civilization] is ever at the edge.”). 
 168. Cf. Delon, supra note 167, at 462 (“[C]ontemporary authors are 
contributing to the continuous displacement of the frontier between the 
Enlightenment and the non-Enlightenment—in other words, they are 
contributing to the transformation and redefinition of the Enlightenment itself.”). 
 169. E.g., Dietrich Berding & Diethelm Klippel, Social Contract, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 167, at 1240-43 (generally 
describing the idea of a social contract as one of the major elements of the 
European Enlightenment).  In particular, “Thomas Hobbes, who is considered the 
father of modern social contract theory, used the concept to justify absolutism.  
On the other hand, a liberal version of the theory, usually associated with John 
Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, did emerge.”  Id. at 1240-41.    
 170. E.g., Didier Deleule, Liberalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, 
supra note 167, at 768 (“Meanwhile in the social and economic realms, the 
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importance of reason (as opposed to faith or superstition) as a 
basis for the acceptance of principles of social ordering,171 and the 
centrality of skepticism and doubt to the necessary task of 
correcting the superstitions and prejudices of earlier ages.172  
Among the most celebrated of these intellects173 were Thomas 
Hobbes (1588–1679),174 René Descartes (1596–1650),175 John Locke 
(1632–1704),176 the Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755),177 David 
Hume (1711–1776),178 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778),179 and 
 
individual acquired new prominence, coming to embody initiative and a certain 
taste for entrepreneurship—a practice that had its roots in individual self-interest 
and adopted the goal of the maximum satisfaction of that same self-interest, 
thereby promoting, in the complex play of social relations initiated in this way, 
what became known as the common good.  In this regard, the function of the state 
was defined as guaranteeing this ‘natural’ individual disposition . . . .”).  As 
explained in Liberalism, “[t]he common basis of political and economic liberalism 
is indeed the individual: the state, having once been master over individuals, was 
required to place itself at their service and become their tool.”  Id. at 769 (citation 
omitted). 
 171. E.g., Schneiders, supra note 167, at 1125-26 (discussing the place of 
reason in particular connection with the German Enlightenment, or Aufklärung); 
see also Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 455-57 (1996) 
(discussing Enlightenment concepts of reason). 
 172. E.g., Babara De Negroni, Doubt, Scepticism and Pyrrhonism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 167, at 392 (“[T]he Enlightenment philosophes 
regarded doubt as the only means of radically challenging the prejudices that 
upbringing and society have inculcated in us and the illusions that constantly 
deceive us . . . . For Enlightenment thinkers, doubt was primarily a critical tool that 
made it possible to denounce errors, prejudices, the illusions to which men fall 
victim, and the machinations employed in order to dominate them more 
effectively.”). 
 173. In the substance of many of their ideas, there could be as much that 
divided some of these writers from one another as united them.  Nevertheless, 
they were all active and renowned during this period, and they all played a role in 
the development of the ideas involved. 
 174. See generally FRANK M. COLEMAN, HOBBES AND AMERICA: EXPLORING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (1977) (providing support for the theory that 
Hobbes is the “true ancestor of American constitutionalism”). 
 175. See generally Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1263 (2004) (discussing generally the work of Descartes during the 
Enlightenment period). 
 176. See generally LOCKE’S MORAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (J.R. Milton 
ed., 1999) (providing a collection of essays analyzing the philosophies of John 
Locke); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985) 
(discussing the writings of John Locke and his contribution to early American 
political ideas). 
 177. See generally ANNE M. COHLER, MONTESQUIEU’S COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND 
THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1988) (acknowledging Montesquieu’s 
work as having a direct influence on the shape of the U.S. Constitution). 
 178. See generally KNUD HAAKONSSEN, THE SCIENCE OF A LEGISLATOR: THE 
NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE OF DAVID HUME AND ADAM SMITH (1981) (providing an 
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Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).180 
Many of the framers were aware of most of these writers.  
Several of them were cited in The Federalist Papers and in other works 
of direct relevance to the Constitution’s establishment.181  While 
certain of these individuals were not explicitly named by the 
framers in the process of drafting the Constitution, the impact of 
their ideas was a substantial basis for concepts reflected in 
constitutional text and structure. 
The impact of Montesquieu’s ideas on the separation of 
powers for the framers is well known.  The authors of The Federalist 
Papers referenced his work repeatedly, at one point anointing him 
with the encomium, “[t]he celebrated Montesquieu.”182  The work 
of John Locke, emphasizing the importance of personal property 
rights, is reflected in the Fifth Amendment Due Process and 
Takings Clauses and elsewhere in the constitutional text.  The basic 
idea of a social contract, initially elaborated upon by Hobbes and 
then refined (to somewhat different effects) by Locke and 
Rousseau, underlies the very concept of a written constitution as a 
pact among its framers, the broader contemporary society, and 
succeeding generations.183  Even when the framers did not 
 
overview of Hume’s theory of justice). 
 179. See generally STEVEN JOHNSTON, ENCOUNTERING TRAGEDY: ROUSSEAU AND THE 
PROJECT OF DEMOCRATIC ORDER (1999) (discussing the work of Rousseau and his 
contributions to western political thought). 
 180. See generally ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT’S THEORY OF JUSTICE (1993) (discussing 
the main elements of Kant’s political philosophy and describing Kant as one of the 
founders of classical liberalism). 
 181. Montesquieu is cited numerous times in The Federalist Papers.  THE 
FEDERALIST No. 9, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan 
Univ. Press 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), supra, at 291-92; THE 
FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra, at 324.  Hume is cited only once.  THE 
FEDERALIST No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 594 n.*.  However, the 
influence of Hume is reported to be significant.  MCDONALD, supra note 165, at 7 
(stating that Hamilton and Madison quoted or paraphrased Hume without 
acknowledgment).  Similarly, the work of John Locke was elemental to many of 
the ideas expressed in The Federalist Papers.  Id.  (affirming that Locke’s theories of 
contract and natural-rights were reiterated without mention of their origin). 
 182. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 181, at 523 n.*.  
Not all references to Montesquieu in The Federalist Papers are equally laudable but 
all evince his influence. 
 183. The relationship between the European Enlightenment and the U.S. 
Constitution has been particularly connected with respect to the growth of 
liberalization in Europe and America.  E.g., Dietrich Berding & Diethelm Klippel, 
Natural Law and the Rights of Man, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra 
note 167, at 895 (“This process [the secularization of natural law into liberal 
natural law] reached a temporary conclusion in North America and France with 
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specifically refer to Enlightenment authors by name, the concepts 
that the Europeans had developed for generations served as the 
basis for much of their thought.184 
A. Fundamental Rights and the Enlightenment 
Among the central concepts developed in the course of the 
European Enlightenment is the singular notion that any human 
being has certain basic rights simply by virtue of being human.185  
This was famously expressed in the Declaration of Independence.186  
It also found political expression, however, in other foundational 
documents of the period, such as the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen.187  The French Declaration echoed 
the American Declaration’s emphasis on the “Pursuit of 
Happiness,”188 presaged the religious liberty guaranteed in the U.S. 
Federal Bill of Rights,189 and helped to usher in the concept of 
 
the bills of rights of various American States, the U.S. Constitution, and the 1789 
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen.”). 
 184. Again, there existed a synergy between liberalizing developments in legal 
and political theory between Europe and America.  E.g., Otto Dann, Nation, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 167, at 883, 885 (“The 
Enlightenment Project of nation building was a project of social emancipation.  
Removing the religious and social barriers of the ancien régime would provide the 
various strata of a single people with the means to integrate into a civil society 
based on a common written culture and organized politically in a modern state.  
Finally, after the United States had gained independence and adopted a 
republican constitution, the new North American nation was held up as a 
precursor in Europe.”). 
 185. See, e.g., 1 GAY, supra note 166, at 3. 
 186. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these 
Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness . . . .”). 
 187. FRANCE: DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN 1789, 
reprinted in COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS, at 208-10 (S.E. Finer et al. eds., 1995). 
 188. E.g., Michel Delon, Happiness, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, 
supra note 167, at 635 (“The happiness that [Louis-Antoine-Léon] Saint-Just was 
invoking [before the French National Assembly] is collective, social, and 
political—the common good rather than individual well-being.  It corresponds to 
the first article of the [Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen]. . . .  
The idea of the pursuit of happiness marked a break with the tradition that had 
placed the highest value on the salvation of the soul or the glory of the prince.”). 
 189. E.g., Hanna Roose, Protestantism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, 
supra note 167, at 1116 (“The [French] Revolution brought religious freedom to 
the Huguenots.  The Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (27 August 1789; 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) guaranteed freedom of 
conscience and of worship.  After 24 December 1789, Protestants were allowed to 
hold public office.”). 
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popular sovereignty.190 
The French Declaration was promulgated by the revolutionary 
French government in 1789, the same year the first U.S. Congress 
was seated pursuant to our current Constitution.191  The text of the 
original U.S. Constitution explicitly guarantees similar fundamental 
rights, such as the right to a trial by jury,192 the right against 
arbitrary imprisonment through petitions for habeas corpus,193 and 
the right to be free from the retroactive impairment of contracts.194  
Upon the adoption of the Bill of Rights two years later, the list of 
explicitly guaranteed rights was expanded. 
B.  Fundamental Rights and the U.S. Constitution 
The modern Supreme Court has developed the concept of 
fundamental rights in a non-textual sense through its 
interpretation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause.  These non-textual fundamental rights can be traced to the 
1942 case of Skinner v. Oklahoma,195 in which the Court referred to 
“marriage and procreation” as being among the “basic civil rights 
of man,” and as being “fundamental to the very existence” of 
humanity.196  Accordingly, the Court in Skinner suggested for the 
first time that “strict scrutiny” was necessary for any governmental 
act that impaired rights that could be considered so basic as to be 
“fundamental” in this sense.197 
Since Skinner, this doctrine of fundamental rights has grown 
 
 190. E.g., Jean Bart, Law, Public, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, supra 
note 167, at 764, 767 (“[P]ublic law [can be defined] as the law ‘that has been 
established for the common use of people considered as a political body.’  It 
differs from ‘private law, which is enacted for the used of each person considered 
individually and independently of other persons.’ . . . Thus the notion of public 
law . . . was at the heart of the political debate waged in the years before the 
French Revolution.  At that period, the concept was easily absorbed into that of 
the [French] constitution . . . before it would be fully implemented in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen . . . .”). 
 191. For a detailed comparison between the French and English revolutions and their 
comparative philosophical impacts on U.S. constitutional law, see Harold J. Berman, The 
Impact of the Enlightenment on American Constitutional Law, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
311 (1992). 
 192. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 193. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 194. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 195. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute 
under which habitual criminals could be sterilized). 
 196. Id. at 541. 
 197. Id. 
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considerably, having been applied through both the Due Process 
and Equal Protection guaranties to protect interests in privacy 
including contraception,198 abortion,199 and marriage,200 and the 
rights of interstate travel201 and voting.202  Activists and litigators 
have attempted at various points in time to expand the list of 
fundamental rights that would be subject to the strict scrutiny 
requirement.  Members of the Supreme Court have been skeptical 
of such efforts.  For example, the Court has declared that 
education is not a fundamental right in this sense.203  Also, in some 
circumstances, an unmarried man’s right to the consortium of his 
minor child does not constitute a fundamental right.204  Initially, 
the Court held in 1986 that the interest perceived by same-sex 
couples to engage in private sexual relations was not a fundamental 
right.205  In 2003, the Court offered protection to this interest but 
 
 198. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding 
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute criminalizing the use of contraceptives and 
the provision of assistance in obtaining contraceptives). 
 199. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional Texas 
statutes criminalizing abortion). 
 200. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a 
Wisconsin statute requiring non-custodial parents obliged to provide financial 
support for minor children to receive court permission before marrying). 
 201. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding 
unconstitutional statutory provisions requiring welfare recipients to have been 
residents of the state for one year prior to applying for benefits). 
 202. E.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (concluding 
that requiring payment of Virginia poll tax as precondition to voting violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 203. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
(concluding that there is no fundamental right to education and that the Texas 
method of funding public education is constitutional). 
 204. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that a California 
statute presuming the cohabiting husband of a woman to be her child’s father did 
not violate due process rights of the child or of the putative natural father).  This 
case is not as much of a negative indicator as it might initially appear.  There was 
no opinion of the Court, and the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia attached 
importance to the fact that the child’s mother was living with a man other than the 
child’s probable father but to whom she was married at the time the child was 
born.  Id. at 129-30.   The case did not present a situation in which the mother was 
unmarried.  Also, the concurring opinion by Justice Stevens, which was necessary 
to help form the judgment, was grounded on statutory interpretation rather than 
the primary constitutional question.  Id. at 133-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
However, on the basis of the Court’s subsequent reluctance to find new 
constitutional rights, I assume that the Court may not be receptive to finding a 
fundamental right for a natural father’s consortium with his child born out of 
wedlock even in more general circumstances. 
 205. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding constitutional a 
Georgia law criminalizing sodomy and explicitly refusing to announce a 
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not necessarily on the basis that it encompassed a fundamental 
right.206 
The primary motivation for the resistance exhibited by Court 
members toward the expansion of fundamental rights is rooted in 
concern for majoritarian democracy.207  After all, whenever strict 
scrutiny is used to invalidate a governmental act that is held to 
impair a fundamental right, the will of the popularly-elected 
legislature is frustrated.  However, the mere observation that the 
enforcement of a fundamental right through strict scrutiny can be 
counter-majoritarian does not answer the question of whether an 
asserted new right should become a fundamental right.  The 
observation may be a basis for urging restraint in finding new 
fundamental rights, but it does not provide a basis for determining 
which asserted rights, from one juncture to the next, should be 
considered fundamental. 
The failure of majoritarianism to provide a key in identifying 
fundamental rights is emphasized by the Enlightenment idea that 
human rights cannot be removed.208  The Declaration of 
 
“fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy”).  Justice White stated that 
“we are quite unwilling” to hold that there is “a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.”  Id. at 191.  Perhaps somewhat famously, at least for 
followers of this area of the law, he added that any claim that “a right to engage in 
such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”  Id. at 194. 
 206. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers and holding 
unconstitutional a Texas statute criminalizing intimate sexual contact between 
persons of the same sex even in the privacy of a home).  The Court in Lawrence 
never indicated whether its holding was based on a determination of the existence 
of a fundamental right.  Indeed, the character of the right on which the Court’s 
holding was based is the subject of some discussion.  See generally Dale Carpenter, Is 
Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140 (2004) (examining how broadly the 
Lawrence decision should be read). 
 207. A passage from Justice White’s opinion of the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick 
illustrates this type of concern: 
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to 
discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.  
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it 
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable 
roots in the language or design of the Constitution. . . .  There should be, 
therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the Due 
Process and Equal Protection] Clauses, particularly if it requires 
redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.  Otherwise, 
the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the 
country without express constitutional authority. 
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95. 
 208. See Berding & Klippel, supra note 183, at 893, 895 (“The rights of man 
established by the United States’ Bill of Rights . . . marked a fundamental 
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Independence refers to basic rights of all persons as being 
“inalienable,” asserting that the rights to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness are simply “among” those so denominated and 
not a complete catalog of them.209  The “inalienability” of these 
rights, as well as the notion that people possess the rights because 
they have been “endowed” by the people’s “creator,” have roots in 
natural-law theory.210  Although natural-law theory was problematic 
for some during the Enlightenment, there is no doubt of its power 
or influence during the period.211 
Members of the Supreme Court rarely offer explicit 
methodologies for identifying fundamental rights.  The only 
prominent example of such an attempt is the plurality opinion in 
the 1989 case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.212  In that opinion, Justice 
Scalia’s explication of a (very limiting) methodology for identifying 
fundamental rights was joined by only one other Justice.213 
It is not difficult to see why some people, including Justice 
Scalia, might be reluctant to find new fundamental rights, even 
apart from the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”214  Trying to 
determine a balance between individual rights and social stability is 
an endeavor of profound implications for a society.  Each political 
society in the world can be defined in terms of the balance it strikes 
between individual rights and the collective interest, whether 
envisioned in terms of stability, tradition, collective will, or some 
other countervailing value.  At first glance, this seems to support an 
ethnocentric view of fundamental rights—if the balance between 
 
transition from the feudal notion of freedom . . . to the concept of the inalienable 
rights of individuals, of man as man, as defined in the Bill of Rights . . . .”). 
 209. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 210. See Berding & Klippel, supra note 183, at 893, 895. 
 211. See, e.g., 2 PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION: THE 
SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 457 (1969) (“In the hands of the philosophes, natural law 
was, in effect, secular, a modern version of classical pagan speculation:  there are 
eternal immutable principles of morality that stand as critics of positive law, for 
they often contradict it.”); accord Berding & Klippel, supra note 183, at 893, 894 
(charting the development of natural-law theory from a sectarian base in the 
Middle Ages through to its later secularization and ultimate status as an aspect of 
liberalism). 
 212. 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 213. The famous “footnote 6” approach set forth in the lead opinion, the 
source of that opinion’s most detailed description of methodology, expressed the 
views only of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 
n.6. 
 214. Basic background discussions of the “counter-majoritarian” or “anti-
majoritarian difficulty” were provided, for example, by authorities such as 
Laurence Tribe. TRIBE, supra note 161, at 61-66. 
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individual rights and the collective interest defines a society, then 
only the authorities of that society should be involved in setting the 
limits of individual rights within it. 
In the larger scheme of things, however, there is no reason to 
suppose that any one society has hit on the optimal balance, in 
some objective sense, between individual rights and the collective 
interest.  Judges in any one society attempting to discern whether 
newly asserted rights should qualify as fundamental might benefit, 
in a subjective sense, from exploring which rights other societies 
have considered to be fundamental.  This is not to suggest that 
judges in one society should feel bound by the rules of another, but 
simply to note that the experience of other societies can be 
informative in their consideration of the issue.215 
C. A Basis for Comparison 
The very idea that fundamental rights cannot be taken away 
even by a majority vote traces its roots to the European 
Enlightenment.  As noted earlier, the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen was issued the same year the first 
government under the U.S. Constitution was established.  John 
Locke’s conception of property as a fundamental right finds its way 
at numerous junctures into the U.S. constitutional tradition, and 
the idea of fundamental notions of liberty is implicit in much of 
Enlightenment theory.216 
The countries in which the European Enlightenment 
flourished217 have had well over two centuries to address and 
 
 215. In his debate with Justice Scalia, for example, Justice Breyer indicated that 
references to foreign sources do not suggest that the foreign sources have 
mandatory effect, allowing that “it’s important that these things not be binding.”  
Scalia & Breyer, supra note 112; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our 
Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 337 (2004) (suggesting that considering the law of foreign 
nations in domestic constitutional opinions is, in the language of the Declaration 
of Independence, according “a decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind,” 
and predicting that the Court “will continue to accord” this respect “as a matter of 
comity and in a spirit of humility”).  The emphasis Justice Ginsburg places in 
“comity” distinguishes the usage of foreign sources for persuasive purposes from a 
usage based on binding precedent. 
 216. E.g., Jürgen Heideking, North America, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 167, at 921, 923 (“In addition to the Declaration of 
Independence, the federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights (added to the 
Constitution in 1791) were the principal American contributions to the 
Enlightenment—contributions that still have not lost their vigor.”). 
 217. Professor Gay discusses the Enlightenment in England, Scotland, France, 
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experiment with the ideas it espoused.  In particular, each of those 
countries has arrived at its own dynamic of balance between 
individual rights and the necessary interests of the State.  There is 
thus a wealth of experience in each of the countries of the 
European Enlightenment regarding the protection and 
accommodation of fundamental rights. 
Other states are unlikely to have experienced the same degree 
of involvement with the idea of fundamental rights over the same 
period of time.218  Even if some states in other parts of the world 
confronted a similar issue during this time period, those states, 
lying outside the geographic area which experienced the 
intellectual and political stimulation of the Enlightenment period, 
would have had fundamentally different experiences than Western 
Europe and the United States. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Western European experience informed and under-
girded much of the U.S. Constitution, especially the concept of 
fundamental rights.219  This could well prove a basis for resolving 
the jurisdictional selection objection in the context of identifying 
fundamental rights.  Those countries that formed a part of the 
European Enlightenment, by virtue of their centuries of experience 
with its concepts, are significantly better suited than others as 
examples of how to resolve the conflict between individual liberty 
and collective security or stability.  Judges, commentators, and 
other observers can safely reference authorities from these 
countries when attempting to identify fundamental rights. 
 
 
Italy, and Germany.  1 GAY, supra note 166, at 3-19. 
 218. I hasten to note that my emphasis on the countries of the European 
Enlightenment is not meant to suggest that other countries of the world are not currently 
“enlightened,” in the modern sense.  Indeed, many other areas of the world have rich and 
illustrious cultural and intellectual histories.  However, the U.S. Constitution has an 
intimate relationship with this particular period of Western intellectual history. 
 219. See supra Parts V-V.A. 
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